When bilingual speakers use two languages in the same utterance, this is called code-switching. Previous research indicates that bilinguals’ likelihood to code-switch is enhanced when the utterance to be produced (1) contains a word with a similar form across languages (lexical triggering) and (2) is preceded by a code-switched utterance, for example from a dialogue partner (interactive alignment/priming of code-switching). Both factors have mostly been tested on corpus data and have not yet been studied in combination. In two experiments, we (...) therefore investigated the combined effects of interactive alignment and lexical triggering on code-switching. In Experiment 1, Dutch-English bilinguals described pictures to each other in a dialogue game where a confederate’s code-switching was manipulated. The participants were free to use either Dutch, English, or a combination of Dutch and English in describing the pictures, so they could voluntarily code-switch or not. The pictures contained a cognate [e.g., roos (rose)], a false friend [e.g., rok (skirt, false friend with rock )], or a control word [e.g., jas (coat)]. Participants code-switched more often when the confederate had just code-switched (indicating interactive alignment). They also code-switched more often when cognates were involved, but only when the confederate had just code-switched. This indicates that lexical triggering is driven by interactive alignment. False friends did not enhance the likelihood of code-switching. Experiment 2 used a similar dialogue game with participants from the same population but focused specifically on how to account for interactive alignment of code-switching. Rather than aligning on their dialogue partner’s pragmatic act of code-switching, bilinguals aligned on the language activation from the utterance produced by their dialogue partner. All in all, the results show how co-activation of languages at multiple levels of processing together influence bilinguals’ tendency to code-switch. The findings call for a perspective on bilingual language production in which cross-speaker and cross-language processes are combined. (shrink)

Van der Heiden works largely with present-day thinkers such as Badiou, Nancy, Romano, Meillassoux, and Agamben, and examines contemporary thought as it seeks to recover a sense of the absolute, but without recourse to specifically theological underpinnings.

Fundamentele filosofische studie over hermeneutiek, opgevat als het stem geven aan degene die niet (meer) zelf kan spreken, met beschouwingen over het betreffende gedachtegoed van enkele vooraanstaande denkers zoals Plato en Heidegger.

Bundel essays over de invloed van de Duitse filosoof (1844-1900) op diverse cultuuruitingen.

_ Source: _Volume 35, Issue 1, pp 53 - 65 Grotius’ apologetic work De veritate must be described as traditional, because the author took all his arguments from existing apologetic literature. He allowed himself some freedom to choose from the apologetic works of such disparate authors as the Protestant Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, the Roman catholic Juan Luis Vives, and the anti-trinitarian Faustus Socinus. What was remarkable in this work was the new combination of arguments. He defended a natural theology like in (...) his early, unpublished work Meletius. This work can be viewed as a predecessor of De veritate. Grotius combined his natural theology with a factual proof of Christian religion, the model for which he found in Socinus’ work De auctoritate Sacrae Scripturae. But his really innovative contribution to apologetic literature was his reduction of the material: he refrained from discussing Christian doctrines and thereby detached apologetics from dogmatics. Thus he wished to offer a remedy for the sickness of Christianity of his days, which in his opinion was plagued by dogmatic disputes that had driven out the truth. (shrink)

When we first anticipated the research project concluded with this special issue, about 8 years ago, it seemed timely and appropriate to investigate the opportunities and the challenges of self-management in mental health care. At the time self-management was well on the rise in general health care, offering both empowerment to patients and efficiency and cost-effectiveness to the health care system. It seemed a most promising approach in an era that celebrates individualistic self-reliance. And we were sure about our insight (...) that self-management in mental health care would deserve comprehensive investigation because “the self” that was supposed to do the management would itself be the core problem in psychiatric... (shrink)

Kitaro Nishida, a famous Japanese Philosopher and the founder of the Kyoto-School, for the first time in history transformed Zen-Buddhism, which here means especially a Japanese school of Buddhism and whose characteristics consists in its methodological meditation, into a philosophical theory of our existence. On the other hand he transformed western philosophy into a very original form of thought, which at the same time contains oriental elements. As Nishida did the bilateral transformation between western and eastern philosophies, he developed a (...) new perspective on the inquiry concerning the individuality of our personal existence and the relation between Self and the other. In his first Work, “An Inquiry into the good” Nishida examines the characteristics of pure experience, which is not understood from the outside, indirectly, and it is not a passive and static experience like for example in ordinary empiricism. It must be understood as active and creative experience which is experienced from within. In reading Thinkers as Ernst Mach and William James he came to realize that there must be a prereflective, pre-individual, unitary pure experience. This pure experience as ultimate reality on which the individual is based, is systematically self developing and Self-unfolding. In Nishidas understanding the pure experience is the common basis for, and is realized prior, to the distinction between subject and object, the Self and the Other, the Knower and the known. I try to explain how Nishidas approach overcomes this subjectivistic perspective and discuss in which way this standpoint offers a new understanding of the Self and the Other. Abe Masao, Ives Christopher: Translation of “An Inquiry into the Good”, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1990. S. xviii. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAls Folge der voranschreitenden Digitalisierung und der COVID-19 Pandemie steigt die Nachfrage nach Indoor-Cycling Plattformen wie ‘Peloton’ exponentiell. Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es zu untersuchen, welche Faktoren die Nutzung von Indoor-Cycling Plattformen nachhaltig beeinflussen. Dafür wurde auf Basis der ‚Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology‘ ein kontextspezifisches Forschungsmodell abgeleitet, das auf Grundlage einer Befragung von 313 Nutzer/innen und des über die Plattform gemessenen Nutzungsverhaltes, überprüft wurde. Die extrinsische Motivation wird insbesondere durch die Trainingsmöglichkeiten getrieben, während Unterstützung durch (...) Trainer/innen der Haupttreiber der intrinsischen Motivation ist. Soziale Interaktion beeinflusst beide Motivationsformen gleichermaßen. Intrinsische und extrinsische Motivation stellen starke Prädiktoren der Nutzungsintention dar, die wiederum nur mäßig die tatsächliche Nutzung beeinflusst, sodass sich Folgestudien stärker auf Barrieren der Nutzung fokussieren sollten. Die Multigruppenanalyse zeigt, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Unterstützung durch Trainer/innen und extrinsischer sowie intrinsischer Motivation bei Männern signifikant höher ausgeprägt ist, als bei Frauen. Bei Frauen ist hingegen der Zusammenhang zwischen sozialer Interaktion und intrinsischer Motivation stärker ausgeprägt. (shrink)

Poverty is associated with a wide range of counterproductive economic behaviors. Scarcity theory proposes that poverty itself induces a scarcity mindset, which subsequently forces the poor into suboptimal decisions and behaviors. The purpose of our work is to provide an integrated, up-to-date, critical review of this theory. To this end, we reviewed the empirical evidence for three fundamental propositions: Poverty leads to attentional focus and neglect causing overborrowing, poverty induces trade-off thinking resulting in more consistent consumption decisions, and poverty reduces (...) mental bandwidth and subsequently increases time discounting and risk aversion. Our findings indicate that the current literature predominantly confirms the first and second proposition, although methodological issues prevent a firm conclusion. Evidence for the third proposition was not conclusive. Additionally, we evaluated the overall status of scarcity theory. Although the theory provides an original, coherent, and parsimonious explanation for the relationship between financial scarcity and economic decision making, the theory does not fully accord with the data and lacks some precision. We conclude that both theoretical and empirical work are needed to build a stronger theory. (shrink)

Alterations in consciousness are among the most common transdiagnostic psychopathological symptoms. Therefore clinical practice would benefit from a clear conceptual framework that guides the recognition, comprehension, and treatment of consciousness disorders. However, contemporary psychopathology lacks such a framework. We describe how pathology of consciousness is currently being addressed in clinical psychology and psychiatry so far, and how the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5) and International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition (ICD-10) refer to this subject. A (...) brief review of the literature on consciousness is then given. After describing psychological perspectives on consciousness and discussing theoretical issues involved in exploring consciousness, we offer a practical clinical working definition of consciousness and we illustrate its connections with a variety of diagnoses. Making use of Jean-Paul Sartre’s distinctions among: states, functions, qualities, and structure, provide a conceptual framework to understand consciousness, to refine diagnostics and to guide the development of therapeutic possibilities in clinical practice. (shrink)

The central theme of this book is the question, Why do scientists pursue scientific investigation? Of course, Bert Theunissen begins by pointing out that the answers scientists offer will be socially acceptable answers. Even so, Theunissen asserts, the historian may infer from the answers what motivated the persons questioned. Moreover, insights may be gleaned concerning science, society, and the relations between the two in the period the scientists lived.In this book the author discusses the notions of the objective of science (...) endorsed, respectively, by Jan Hendrik van Swinden , Jan van der Hoeven , Pieter Harting , Gerrit Jan Moll , Franciscus C. Donders , Hugo de Vries , Martinus W. Beijerinck , and Hendrik Antoon Lorentz .From this list of names it appears that Theunissen has focused his study on the nineteenth century. That period is especially interesting with respect to the changing images of science, as the ideas of the main goal of the university altered completely during that period. At the beginning of the century providing an academic education was seen as the prime task. Research was not seen as part of the duties of a professor at all. Those that did any experimentation chose to do so for their own sake, not because it was an element of the curriculum. That had changed completely by the end of the century. By then scientific investigation was considered a regular—in fact the most important—task of the university. This change in focus went hand in hand with the establishment of a number of new laboratories for most Dutch universities.In the accounts of the above‐mentioned men the content and development of their ideas about the pursuit of science are examined. From this analysis the common element that emerges in their images of science is gain for society, as expressed in the title, which translates into English as something like “Profit and more profit.” In the view of these men the pursuit of science is profitable for society; it is not pursued just for its own sake, let alone for the pleasure of the pursuer. In the beginning of the century the well‐trained minds of an intellectual elite that had completed academic training was regarded as the prime benefit for society. By the end of the century the profit was understood to come from scientific investigation of nature: science was seen as an instrument to further human welfare.Initially, I found it surprising that each and every one of the leading persons confidently asserts that the pursuit of science is for the benefit of society at large. Yet, on closer inspection, that was not so surprising, as Theunissen has studied and quotes almost exclusively from published sources, from treatises written for fellow scholars, for administrators, and for the lay public. The author seems not to have studied correspondence or other private papers in which a man may have voiced less elevated purposes for the pursuit of science.One thing amazed me: in the whole of this work, covering over a hundred years of discussion and the ideas of some 300 Dutch scholars on the subject at hand, there is not one woman mentioned. Admittedly, by the time the present story finishes, in the early twentieth century, only a few women had been appointed to academic positions in Dutch universities, so there is presumably not much material to draw on. However, one argument in the debate raging in the last quarter of the nineteenth century about the admission of women to the universities was the view that women, like men, should have the benefit of a higher education so as to fully develop their minds.Most of the contents of this book have appeared in print already in the form of separate articles in various journals, some in English but mostly in the Dutch language. Presumably that explains why the author has chosen to publish his treatise in Dutch rather than English. Even though the author has stressed the national character of his exposé by discussing at length some controversies among Dutch historians of science on points he addresses, the issues considered in this book and the scope of the inquiry warrant international notice and discussion.This book has a pleasantly unpretentious layout and typography and is, moreover, very carefully produced: I have seen but one printing error—which I leave it to you to discover. (shrink)

ABSTRACT There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: free agency is grounded in an agent’s possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, only actual sequence features can ground free agency. This paper argues that and can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. (...) According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, and can’t be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness. (shrink)

Many think it is plausible that agents enjoy freedom and responsibility with respect to their actions in virtue of being reasons-responsive. Extant accounts spell out reasons-responsiveness (RR) as a general modal property. The agent is responsive to reasons for and against ϕ-ing, according to this idea, if they ϕ in accordance with the balance of reasons in a suitable proportion of possible situations. This paper argues that freedom and responsibility are not grounded in such modal properties on the basis of (...) a phenomenon I call ‘rational blind spots’. Agents have highly specific local blockages (or openings) that prevent them from seeing or reacting for a particular type of reason. When these blind spots are triggered, agents fail to be responsive to reasons in the sense relevant to freedom and responsibility. Thus, we judge that they are not free and responsible. But bind spots don’t remove the agent’s possession of general modal RR properties. Thus, extant accounts of reasons-responsiveness render the incorrect result that the agents in these cases remain responsible because they remain responsive to reasons in a general sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Joint and Grief AchesHeer HendrySomething that surprised me when I started my clinical rotations in medical school was how often we discussed proper footwear. In the lulls of rounds, I've heard healthcare providers talk about how worn-down shoes or inadequate arch support have caused them joint and back pains. We spend hours on our feet and bring the aches home with us, a reminder of our workday as we (...) walk our dogs or grocery shop. Embarrassingly, this is what was on my mind as I was starting a 12-hour shift wearing a new pair of shoes that an ICU nurse had recommended.It was the third day of my emergency medicine rotation, and my team received descriptions and plans for the 23 patients in the department precisely at 0700. I scribbled notes about each patient on my notepad, learning to distinguish which aspects of each patient were important to carry into this next shift for good continuity of care. For one patient, my note read: "aspiration, sepsis, hospice."My resident and I walked into each room and introduced ourselves, confirmed their story, and updated them on the next steps that we would be working on. The 4th patient on our list was the one I noted above—an 87-year-old male who was brought in after repeated bouts of emesis (vomiting) and choking. This was his fifth hospital visit this year for similar chief complaints, two of which resulted in ICU stays. Hours earlier, his two sons and two daughters had made the decision to place him on hospice.Upon entering the room, I saw an elderly patient lying on a stretcher with his eyes closed, grimacing and breathing rapidly. There was a younger man at his bedside staring at the patient while drumming his fingers on a coffee cup from a gas station next to the hospital. He didn't notice us walk in and was startled as we began to introduce ourselves. He identified himself as the patient's son, telling us he had just arrived at the hospital but had been on a conference call with his other siblings and palliative care earlier. His eyes darted between us and his father's rapid, shallow breaths.We updated him on his father's condition, explaining that we'd been making him comfortable with morphine and benzodiazepines. We talked about his blood lactic acid, his electrolytes, and his feeding tube. He continued drumming his fingers on the cup and nodding as we discussed trying to find an inpatient bed for his father. We informed him about the unpredictability of how much longer he would be alive and the unlikelihood of discharge. We asked if we could answer any questions for him, and he shook his head, but as we opened the door to leave, he asked: "So, the morphine is shutting down his body, right?" We clarified the purpose of the morphine, explaining that the morphine was making him comfortable and pain-free, but that his body was shutting down on its own."But in a way I'm still killing him?" he asked. My chest squeezed tight at that question. My goal for this patient immediately changed from getting him a bed in the inpatient unit to convincing his son that he was not harming his father. We started from the beginning and explained the lab markers and prognosis once again and asked if he'd like to speak to palliative care in person. He simply nodded as we exited to give him privacy.Leaving that room, it was barely 7:00 am. We still had 19 other patients to check on. My chest was still tight, but I could not allow my mind to remain in that room while the other patients were still pending exams, workups, and admissions. I acknowledged to myself that reflection would have to occur later, and yet, as we walked to the next [End Page e16] room, I wondered if the resident I was with had lost anyone in his life as I have in mine. Seeing the son trying to process and understand the situation in real time triggered my memories of past times... (shrink)

Depuis Jules Ferry, l'histoire est la principale arme d'assaut de propagande d'Etat. Par les manuels et les leçons, l'école républicaine n'a cessé de truquer et de tronquer ce que l'honnête citoyen pouvait écrire. La mise en condition et le " formatage " du citoyen se poursuivent tout au long de sa vie par le commun des journaux, les romans et les images, les célébrations nationales, les émissions télévisées, les directives et les interdits. Ces tout derniers temps, l'Etat veut, en France, (...) soumettre la démarche historique à une étroite surveillance et laisse de moins en moins de liberté aux centres de recherche qui n'ont même plus le loisir de choisir en toute indépendance leurs sujets d'enquête et leurs programmes.L'Histoire s'est dévoyée. Elle se dit " science humaine " mais n'étudie souvent que des catégories, des classes et ordres, des conditions sociales où l'individu paraît effacé, inexistant, soumis à la géographie, à l'évolution des techniques, à l'économie ou même au " sens de l'Histoire ". Elle édicte des règles qui ne souffrent ni exceptions ni contradictions. Du Moyen Age à nos jours, Jacques Heers dresse ici un inventaire des manipulations de l'Histoire. (shrink)

A fun introduction in comics to deep thinking and the history of philosophy -- Back cover.

Agency often consists in performing actions and engaging in activities that are successful. We pour glasses, catch objects, carry things, recite poems, and play instruments. It has therefore seemed tempting in recent philosophical thinking to conceptualise the relationship between our agentive abilities and our successes as follows: (Success) S is exercising their ability to ϕ only if S successfully ϕ-s. This paper argues that (Success) is false based on the observation that agency also often consists in making mistakes. We bungle (...) things. We spill water, we miss objects thrown at us, we drop things, misremember lines, and mess up songs. I argue that these mistakes, doings that fall short of being a φ-ing, can only be understood as subpar exercises of the ability to φ. Since this understanding is incompatible with (Success), the thesis should be given up. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to create dialectical space for a hitherto under-discussed option in the philosophy of conspiracy theories. The extant literature on the topic almost exclusively assumes that conspiracy theories are a type of explanation. The typical mental attitude towards explanations is belief, a representational attitude that can be assessed as true, false, warranted or unwarranted. I call models based on this assumption alethic models. Alethic models can’t pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental (...) attitudes without latching onto their negative epistemic properties. The extant literature therefore finds itself in an unfortunate situation. It either has to presume that conspiracy theories are epistemically defective in general (generalism). Or it has to deny that conspiracy theories are a distinct class of mental attitudes. Conspiracy theories are then nothing more than theories, theories about conspiracies, and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis (particularism). Instead, this paper motivates the research program of narrative models. According to narrative models, conspiracy theories are first and foremost stories – structured fictions. And their relevant mental attitudes are the attitudes of fiction – make-believe and imagination. Fictions are not subjects to epistemic norms. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models can therefore pick out conspiracy theories as a distinct class of mental attitudes without labeling them as defective in general. In addition, they are able to explain certain features of conspiracy discourse particularly well, and they offer new perspectives on the popularity of conspiracy theories and the means of intervention we have at our disposal. (shrink)

According to a popular idea, freedom is grounded in orthonomy – the ability to be responsive to normative demands. But how exactly must an agent’s action relate to their reasons in order for this orthonomous relationship to hold? In this paper, I propose a novel explanationist answer to this question. I argue that extant answers – causalism and modalism about orthonomy – fail because they fail to account for the fact that intuitions about freedom and orthonomy track facts about explanation. (...) And these facts cannot be reduced to either causal or modal facts. Instead, I propose that we should understand freedom as grounded in special accidentality-dispersing explanations in terms of normative reasons. The resultant view is to be understood as following a Frankfurtian intuition: only factors that explain action can be relevant to whether the action is free. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the period that immediately followed the invention of the Leiden jar. Historians of science have developed narrations that emphasize the role of grounding during the process of charging the jar. In this respect, this episode shows significant aspects that can be used to characterize science, scientific knowledge production, and the nature of science. From our own experimentation, we learned that grounding was not necessary in order to produce the effect. These experiences inspired us to go (...) back to primary sources. In doing so, we came to a new understanding of the early period after Kleist’s and Musschenbroek’s initial creation of the effect. From our analysis, we conclude that it is not the grounding which was perceived as a major innovation (as well as a challenge) during this early period of the discussion but the concept of an electrical circuit. This understanding was fundamental in characterizing the Leiden jar as a new device challenging the then current knowledge of experimental practices in the field of electricity. (shrink)

Agents sometimes have a final, de dicto desire to do what is right. They desire to do what is right for its own sake and under this description. These agents have pure moral motivation (PMM). It is often surmised that PMM is in some sense defective. Most famously, it has been suggested that PMM manifests a kind of moral fetishism. However, it also seems defective if an agent shows no concern whatsoever for moral rightness in their motivations. In this paper, (...) I attempt to resolve this puzzling tension. I argue, first, that PMM is defective insofar as it manifests a failure to respond to reasons. I argue, second, that not every instance of PMM manifests a responsiveness failure. In particular, we need to distinguish between the de dicto final desire to do what is right and the de dicto final desire to do what is right for the right reasons. (shrink)